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Genetic Use Restriction (or Terminator) Technologies
(GURTs) in Agricultural Biotechnology: The Limits of
Technological Alternatives to Intellectual Property
Chidi Oguamanam†

Introduction

seeds to fundamentally alter their self-reproducing character, or to induce trait susceptibility, selection or suppression. Since the first patent for this technology was
granted in the United States in March 1998, 5 terminator
technology has been perceived in the broader context of
genetic modification in food and agricultural materials.
Oppositions to the technology are staked on that inclusive background and they encompass traditional objections to genetic modification and attendant privatization
of life forms. In a nutshell, the grounds of objection
include ethical concerns about a technology that is oriented toward seed sterility and trait manipulation, the
general environmental or ecological impacts of terminator varieties, as well as long and short term effect of
terminator varieties on biological diversity and public
health. 6

A

major challenge to sustaining exponential advances
in biotechnology and digital technology in the last
couple of decades has been the need for a suitable protection and appropriation regime for these technologies.
While the malleability of intellectual property rights continues to be stretched to accommodate novel advances
in both digital and biological technologies, indications
are that other proprietary options are increasingly
becoming attractive to stakeholders in these technologies. 1 The limits of traditional intellectual property
rights and, perhaps more so, the natures of the two technologies have forced stakeholders to explore alternative
protective regimes. The need for a tighter proprietary
framework to support digital and biotechnology
endeavours stems mainly from the perception that valuable information or inventions in the two areas are particularly expensive to generate and effortlessly inexpensive to reproduce. 2
With regard to genetic modification in plant materials or agricultural biotechnology in general, the inherently self-reproducing nature of transgenic or genetically
modified materials, particularly seeds, makes it rather
tasking for traditional intellectual property rights to efficiently protect the proprietary interests of inventors and
investors alike. This article evaluates the progression of
knowledge protection in agricultural biotechnology
through traditional intellectual property rights, its sui
generis versions, legislative interventions, and contractual
devices to the contemporary epoch of a molecular or
technology-driven intellectual property alternative exemplified in genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs),
more commonly known as terminator technology. 3
Terminator technology is a very recent and
emerging phenomenon. It derives its nickname from
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s science fiction movie of the
same name. 4 Generally, terminator technology is a twoprong biotechnological device for inducing sterility in

Other sources of reservation include the nature of
interaction of terminator varieties with other crops and
the potential of the varieties to induce sterility on nonterminator or non-transgenic varieties through the phenomenon of ‘‘gene wandering’’. Also, there is unease over
the potential impact of terminator technology in regard
to displacement of traditional agricultural practices of
indigenous, rural and smallholder farming communities,
such as seed-exchange and the component cultures of
seeding. 7 Equally, a considerable source of worry is the
suggestion that if the six big Northern based global multinational life sciences corporations 8 that now capitalize
on the convergence of crop biotechnology with
agrochemical and seed production were to adopt terminator technology, it would accentuate the North–South
asymmetry in agriculture and food production to an
unprecedented level. Such an oligopoly would grossly
limit farmers’ choice in terms of crop varieties, trait selections, local adaptation of materials, etc. 9 thus raising concerns about paucity of agro biodiversity and food
security, especially in the developing countries.
The foregoing concerns do not exhaustively articulate the reasons for the intense popular reservations over
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terminator technologies or GURTs and the phenomenon of genetic modification. However, they are sufficient to establish the diverse grounds upon which such
objections are staked. In response to these concerns, consideration of terminator technology has been incorporated into regulatory initiatives on the genetic modification of living organisms at national and international
levels. 10
It is important to indicate that the technologies are
not yet approved for commercial exploitation and available knowledge about them is based on greenhouse and
laboratory experimentations. 11 Unlike other products of
agro biotech, such as genetically modified food and
transgenic plant materials, debates on health, biosafety
and other ramifications of terminator varieties are now
underway at the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 12 as a prelude to anticipated official
approval of the technologies for commercial exploitation. 13 In general, the emphases of popular global apprehension over genetic modification as a whole and terminator technology in particular are placed on ethical,
health, biosafety and broader environmental questions.
While focusing on these, general concerns about terminator technology barely broach the policy implications
of the self-enforcing technological alternative to intellectual property rights which this technology portends. 14
This article examines the adequacy of terminator
technology as a potential substitute for traditional intellectual property. It acknowledges that the technology
provides a stronger protection and reward mechanism
than that offered by the traditional intellectual property
rights regime. However, terminator technology or any
other technology for that matter, is outside the pantheon
of intellectual property regimes. Fundamentally, terminator is a technological answer to the quest by private
sector interests to improve appropriability of returns on
investments in agrobiotech. It potentially represents a
panacea to the long standing industry struggle over the
profitability of private research in agrobiotech and the
need to improve appropriability of returns on investments in self-pollinating plant varieties. Terminator technology constitutes a molecular or cellular proprietary
control mechanism for plant genetic resources (PGR).
Consequently, terminator technologies are attractive
assets to private sector investors in agricultural research.
However, the nature of terminator technology as ‘‘a technological response to an institutional problem’’ 15 undermines a major policy plank of intellectual property
rights, namely, the preservation of knowledge in the
public domain through time limit on protection and the
requirement of compulsory disclosure. As a prospective
molecular substitute for or imitation of intellectual property, terminator technology not only provides no known
agronomic benefit to farmers, 16 but also has the potential
to freeze up opportunities for knowledge transmission,
accretion, development and diffusion of technology in
transgenic crops. This article argues that any potential
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technological substitute for intellectual property that sacrifices the latter’s underlying public policy objective of
the promotion and dissemination of knowledge in the
public domain may be overkill in the hands of industry.
To the extent that terminator technology does not
account for the public domain consideration which is a
material aspect of intellectual property, it may not be an
acceptable substitute. Even though they may fix perceived institutional problems, by their nature, technologies alone do not address the public policy nuances
imbedded in conventional intellectual property jurisprudence.
In exploring the foregoing issues, this article is
divided into three major parts. Part I evaluates the private
sector’s quest for profitable appropriability of returns on
investments in agricultural biotechnology, with
emphasis on plant/seed breeding. It also explores the
progressive response of intellectual property to accommodate that desire. Part II focuses on the nature and
concept of GURTs as a self-enforcing technological imitation of intellectual property and ongoing public policy
scrutiny of the technologies. It evaluates the terminator
initiative as akin to industries’ vote of no confidence on
extant attempts by conventional and sui generis intellectual property regimes to accommodate their quest for a
tighter appropriatary and control regime. Part III
broaches the public policy underlying the philosophy of
intellectual property and evaluates the shortcoming of
terminator technology as a technological imitation intellectual property. The paper concludes by pointing to the
need for direct inclusion of intellectual property considerations in the ongoing discussions on the way forward
for GURTs. This paper, then, is meant to assist in creating a balance between the extant focus of those initiatives on environmental, biosafety, health and socio-economic issues and a consideration of the intellectual
property ramifications of GURTs.

Part I
PGR and Intellectual Property: The
Dynamics of the Pre-Terminator Era
Plant Breeding Regime and Other Sui Generis
Response

H

istorically, farmers generated new plant varieties or
improved on existing ones through trans-generational and informal innovations with PGR. In such traditional settings, farmers chiefly relied on general observations of ecological patterns in the ‘‘careful selection from
randomly occurring mutations in nature’’. 17 Varieties
were deliberately selected first on the basis of their
adaptability to the vagaries of local ecological conditions
before consideration was given to their economic viability. Because of the informal and communal nature of
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traditional agricultural endeavours, appropriability of
new or improved genetic resources or novel plant varieties was a matter of no serious concern. The incremental nature of such informal innovations made it difficult to identify when and from whom a new plant
ariety was introduced. 18
All this changed with the advent of formal scientific
and entrepreneurial plant breeding some 125 years
ago. 19 Plant breeding became a target of organized scientific activity, a situation that raised concerns not only
about incentives for public sector research but also in
regard to returns on private sector investments in the
field. Unlike the traditional approach, scientific plant
breeding is essentially an exercise in deliberate incorporation of specific or desired traits to create new or hybrid
varieties using molecular techniques and other scientific
information. 20 From its evolution as early as the
14th century, 21 intellectual property rights, specifically
patents, were limited to conferring exclusive rights to
inventors of industrial or technical inventions. 22 Thus,
historically, the paradigms of conventional intellectual
property as a mechanism for appropriation and control
of technical inventions did not extend to living materials
such as plants or plant varieties. 23
With the formal scientific and private sector
entrepreneurial approach to plant breeding, the paradigms of intellectual property rights extended to living
materials 24 through a rather dynamic trajectory that we
will explore shortly. In regard to PGR, the self-reproducing nature of seed, like the fluidity and easy replication of information in digital technology, does not guarantee effective control over the use of a proprietary plant
variety that has been released to the farmer. According to
Srinivasan and Thirtle, ‘‘[t]he vast discrepancy between
the benefits that could be appropriated privately by the
breeder and the total social benefits [inherent in the selfreproducing nature and agronomic value of seed]
implied that the market mechanism would fail to produce a socially desirable level of investment or effort in
plant breeding’’. 25 Attempts to mitigate this form of
‘‘market failure’’ in both developed and developing
countries by the provision of investment through public
sector research in plant breeding, while partially successful, could not endure because of dwindling financial
support. 26
Declining public sector investment in R & D in an
era of privatization, a progressive extension of intellectual
property rights over living materials, and private sectordriven exponential increase in the biotechnology 27
industry dictated that the issue of control or
appropriability of investment in plant breeding and seed
production be tackled. In order to profitably ‘‘commoditize’’ 28 seeds, it became necessary that ‘‘institutional
[interventions or regulatory] barriers be placed on [dealings with] self-reproducing characteristics of seed . . .’’. 29
This imperative paved the way for the progressive evolution of intellectual property rights on PGR in the
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former’s conventional and sui generis formulations, and
lately, in the technological imitation of intellectual property rights represented by the terminator.

Increasing private sector participation in plant
breeding in Europe, the United States and Canada,
spurred a spate of Plant Variety Protection (PVP) legislation. As mentioned earlier, because of the historical
emphasis of conventional intellectual property, specifically patents, on technical inventions and industrial
products and processes, it was not considered a suitable
appropriation regime for living materials in general and
plant breeding in particular. 30 Indeed, the plant breeding
process is not easily expressed in the exact technical
details required for the patenting of technical inventions. 31 While early PVP legislation in European countries dated from around the 1940s, 32 the United States
had a head start with the enactment of the Plant Patent
Act (PPA) of 1930 33 which aimed at granting special
patent protection for innovations in asexually reproducing plants, especially for the horticultural industry.
That legislation provided the juridical framework for the
subsequent Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) of
1970 34 which targeted sexually or non-asexually reproducing plants. 35
Despite the variegations in the details of various
PVP laws in European States, the U.S. and Canada, essentially, they confer rights on breeders (hence, plant
breeders’ right or PBR) and impose limits on the rights of
users or buyers of protected seed, in order to facilitate
breeders’ profitable seed trade in proprietary varieties.
However, given the divergences in national PVP laws,
distortions in the scope of rights of plant breeders across
national boundaries compelled the need for a uniform
transnational PVP regime. Premised on the national
treatment principles, the 1961 International Convention
for the Protection of New Plant Varieties (UPOV) 36 was
born to address this need. UPOV recognizes the importance of isolation, distinctness or identification of a
variety as its warrant for intellectual property protection.
Under the UPOV, uniform criteria for protection of new
plant varieties are limited to varieties possessing the features of novelty, 37 distinctiveness, uniformity and stability.
While facilitating breeders’ rights, including
breeders’ exclusive commercial trade in propagating
materials or seeds of protected varieties, the UPOV as a
sui generis IPRs regime is clearly distinct from conventional patents. Like other national PVP regimes, the Convention incorporates two exemptions to breeders’ exclusive appropriation and control of a protected variety. 38
The first exemption grants farmers the privilege to use
farm-saved seeds from protected varieties obtained from
breeders. Thus, breeders’ rights did not trump farmers’
age-long traditional practices to save seeds even of a protected variety after harvest. 39 The second exemption,
referred to as research exemption, allows the use of protected varieties for research or experiment. Under this
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exemption, a subsequently resulting variety could be
commercialized without the authorization of, or payment of compensation to, the original holder of the
plant breeders’ right. The practical translation of this
exemption is that under the UPOV regime of 1978 plant
breeders’ right did not include the right to genes as
principal genetic materials of protected varieties. 40
The enactment of national PVP legislation in most
developed countries and the subsequent coming into
effect of a harmonized international PVP regime under
the UPOV in 1961 did not have the desired impact of
boosting profitable private sector participation in plant
breeding, or so it was perceived. Aside from the perennially self-reproducing nature of seeds that makes proprietary control impossible, exemptions in those regimes on
the bases of farmers’ privilege and research are cited as
the glaring weaknesses of the PVP regime that scuttled
viable appropriation of returns from non-hybrid crops. 41
Despite paucity of data, available information, even
though limited in scope, indicate that PVP laws have not
yielded private sector quest for profitability of breeding
non-hybrid crops. 42 Essentially, because of these two
exemptions, the PVP is perceived as to be deficient as an
incentive regime for protection of innovations in seed
breeding.
Not surprisingly, the UPOV has been revised three
times since 1961. 43 The most radical of these revisions
was the revision of the 1978 version in 1991. The latter is
a major departure from the prior regime and an aggressive attempt to plug its ‘‘leaky’’ provisions and perceived
indulgences to farmers. Under the 1991 UPOV,
breeders’ rights supersede farmers’ privilege and extend
to all species and all circumstances for reproduction of
the seeds of protected varieties. Member states have the
option to provide for a farmers’ exemption under
national law. 44 It extends breeders’ rights to even harvested material, 45 or varieties ‘‘essentially derived’’ from a
protected one. 46 It increases the duration of rights to 20
years, 47 all in an attempt to bring PVP laws as close as
possible to the tighter utility patent regime.
These changes in UPOV have since been reflected
in the national laws of a majority of its member states.
For instance, ‘‘in almost the whole of Europe, farmers’
privilege no longer exist except in the case of small
farmers’’, 48 whereas all other farmers are required to pay
royalties to PBR holders for the use of farm-saved seed
associated with a protected breed. 49 In Canada, the 1990
Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 50 seems to have pre-empted
the 1991 UPOV revisions even though it provides for an
18-year duration of breeders’ right. The principal PVP
law in the United States on the protection of inventions
on sexually reproducing plant varieties is the 1970
PVPA. 51 Along the spirit of the earlier UPOV regime, the
PVPA allowed farmers’ sale of farm-saved seeds of a protected variety. This popular practice, nationally referred
to in that country as ‘‘brown-bag’’ sales, 52 not only
secured seeds for farmers for the next planting season,
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but also enabled them to sell farm-saved seeds to other
farmers and persons.
Yet, because of the prevalence of brown-bagging, its
perceived impact on the profitability of seed companies’
operations reopened concerns about a tighter
appropriability regime for propagating materials. Following on the heels of encouraging judicial decisions
circumscribing farmers’ (also crop) and research exemptions in the U.S. 53 and the 1991 revisions of the UPOV,
in 1994, the U.S. amended the 1970 PVPA. The new
amendment prohibits farmers from selling farm-saved
seeds while it preserves their rights to save seeds for the
sole purpose of replanting their fields only. Similarly, the
research exemption has been circumscribed to ensure
that it does not cover non-experimental undertakings. 54
Contractual Response
A responsive and tighter PVP regime is at the
instance of individual governments and, in the case of
the UPOV, a collective initiative of mainly industrialized
countries of North America and their European counterparts. 55 Private sector actors in agricultural biotechnology
and seed production, in particular, have grown in power
and in the influence they wield in the corridors of power
in both their home base in the North and their outposts
in the South. For the most part, they share in the credit
of getting governments to address industry sponsored
urgency to improve the appropriability of returns on
investments in agricultural biotechnology and self-pollinating or non-hybrid plant varieties in particular.
Indications are that these corporations are not
resting on their oars. Despite strides in improved PVP
regimes, agrobiotech corporations have continued to
adopt customized contractual arrangements and marketing strategies to ensure improved appropriability and
profitable returns on investments. As part of their marketing strategy, seed corporations have, in the last two
decades, been involved in a spate of mergers and acquisitions in an effort to consolidate both their service and
product delivery, and to secure tighter appropriation of
their intellectual properties. Commercial agricultural or
agrobiotech research, industrial seed and allied
agrochemical production now converge and concentrate
under few corporate strongholds. 56 It is then possible for
them to take on individual or boutique farmers whose
choices are limited in take-it-or-leave-it contractual agreements.
For instance, by means of special purchase and
other contracts 57 with ‘‘terminator clauses’’, 58 farmers are
restrained from dealing with the harvested crop of a
protected variety otherwise than for sale or consumption
as food. Thus, it is possible and certainly legitimate for
seed corporations to resort to contractual devices in
order to undermine the little statutory window that
allows farmers to use farm-saved seeds of a protected
variety in their own farms under PVP laws. Similarly, in
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this asymmetrical contractual paradigm, corporations
also negotiate highly intrusive powers in order to monitor or audit farmers’ compliance with these onerous
agreements. Today, farmers’ fields, in the eyes of multinational seed corporations, also double as potential forensic
laboratories of evidence against recalcitrant farmers. This
is so in the former’s quest to improve appropriation of
return on investment and to enforce compliance with
onerous contractual agreements. This, sometimes,
involves the use of private investigators or what has been
termed ‘‘gene police’’.
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which there is an existing patent. Essentially, patent protects against production or manufacture or all other
forms of exploitation and use of a patented product or
process. 65 The law interprets the concept of ‘‘use’’ for the
purposes of patent infringement very liberally to the
advantage of a patent holder. 66 In the famous 2004 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Monsanto
Canada Inc. v. Percy Schmeiser, 67 the Court observed
that where a party employed a patented invention and
thereby deprived the patent owner full or exclusive
enjoyment of the patent monopoly, it does not matter
what the offending party intended, or that he did not
profit from the invention. Given its emphasis on
preventing farmer profiteering at the expense of
breeders, it is not likely that the PVP regime we have
reviewed could provide such an extensive protection to a
right holder that utility patent does. Thus, empirically,
the scope of protection of right holders under utility
patent trumps the rights of breeders under the PVP
regime.

Developments on the Patent Regime
Apart from improvements in PVP laws as a sui
generis intellectual property option and special contracts,
efforts to improve appropriation and control of PGR are
evident in the progressive judicial re-conceptualization
and expansion of the patent regime to the realm of living
organisms. In retrospect, the original reluctance to
xtend patent protection to living materials appears to
ave been shortsighted as it is no longer sustainable. At
Proprietary stakeholders in agrobiotech can now
esent, only a few would fault the characterization of
indulge in multiple protection options to secure the
t approach as one premised on obsolete jurispruappropriability and control of their investments. To this
nce.
end, the 1994 International Agreement on Trade-Related
68 under
In a 1980 landmark decision, the U.S. SupremeAspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
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its controversial Article 27 provides, in part, that
Court held in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, that a non‘‘[m]embers may provide for the protection of plant varinaturally occurring human-made genetically modified
eties either by [utility] patents or by effective sui generis
bacterium designed to breakdown components of crude
system or combination thereof . . .’’. 69 It is important to
oil was patentable subject matter under U.S. law. 60 The
point out that today TRIPS represents the most compresignificance of that decision transcends its specific facts. It
hensive and arguably the most authoritative global
lies, perhaps, in the Court’s recourse to the legislative
regime on intellectual property rights. As a component
history of the U.S. Patent Act in making a declaration
instrument of the Uruguay Round of General Agreethat when interpreting the Act, a liberal approach is
ments on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), its so called minpreferred. 61 Thus, according to Chief Justice Burger,
imum standards of intellectual property protection are
‘‘Congress intended statutory [patent] subject matter to
applicable to all members of the World Trade Organiza‘include anything under the sun that is made by man’’’. 62
tion (WTO) which administers the GATT. In regard to
Thus, creations of ‘‘human ingenuity’’, including nonintellectual property, TRIPS is described as ‘‘the only
naturally occurring living materials, constitute new,
game in town’’. 70 It has entrenched a concurrent protecuseful, ‘‘manufacture or composition of matter’’ under
tion of plant varieties by both patent and PVP.
section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act. As if to remove any
lingering doubts, in 1985, the U.S. Patent Board of
Appeals held that the existence of both the 1930 PPA
Whether under various national PVP laws,
and the 1970 PVPA did not preclude the application of
including their international consolidation under the
utility patents on new plant varieties. 63 The U.S.’s so
UPOV, or various national intellectual property laws,
called liberal approach which has seen a patent issued
including the global intellectual property regime under
for a genetically modified onco mouse is different from
TRIPS, intellectual property rights are expensive and difthe Canadian approach which has denied patent protecficult to enforce. Despite the complexity and cost of
tion to the same concept. 64
procuring these legal proprietary devices, seeds are still
Conventional or utility patents are attractive to
propagating materials. Thus, there is a limit to which
commercial breeders because they provide stronger proseed exchange and propagating materials on their own
tection and control. They are not subject to research and
can be monitored even by the most aggressive right
crop or farmers’ exemptions which remain sticking
holders whether as plant breeders or utility patentees or
points in the PVP regime. Unlike the case with PVP or
both. Private sector pursuit of a cost efficient and waterother intellectual property regimes, a patent right
tight proprietary control mechanism for genetic materexcludes the claim of earlier or later inventors who indeials in agrobiotech remains an ongoing commitment.
pendently or contemporaneously invent the exact same
That commitment takes a totally novel dimension in the
subject matter (in this case a new plant variety) over
phenomenon of terminator technology.
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Part II
The Era of the Terminator
History and Nature of Terminator

T

hree years after the coming into force of the TRIPS
Agreement in 1995, the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) and Delta & Pine Land Company
astonished the world when, in 1998, they announced
obtaining U.S. Patent No. 5,723,765 titled ‘‘Patent for the
Control of Plant Gene Expression’’. 71 That is the first
‘‘terminator’’ patent. Since that patent was obtained,
many multinational agrochemical and seed corporations
have continued to research into this novel biotechnological phenomenon and to procure patents in genetic
seed sterilization. 72 Essentially, terminator technology is a
new biotechnology or genetic engineering device to
achieve suppression of true-to-type-second generation
seeds or genetic copy propagation.
For the most part, this technology is industry’s
weapon to prohibit unauthorized seed-saving of proprietary seeds by farmers in order to maximize appropriation
of returns on agrobiotech investments in seed production and effective marketing of component agrochemical
inducers. As indicated in Part I, both utility patents and
PVP laws, apart from being expensive to procure and
enforce, do not guarantee rights holders’ absolute control
and appropriation of their interests in PGR. Instead of
trusting farmers as users of proprietary varieties to
honour the intellectual property rights of breeders, crops
are genetically modified to deprive them of the ability to
germinate when replanted using terminator technology.
This vests crops with a self-enforcing capacity in regard
to breeder’s intellectual property rights. Unlike the PVP
regime, terminator technology vests in the breeder absolute control of plant gene and cell.
Terminator technology is, however, not all about
seed sterility. The technical description of the underlying
technologies is ‘‘genetic use restriction technologies’’ (i.e.,
GURTs). Loosely, there are two embedded principal
biotechnological devices in issue. The one incorporates
variety-genetic use restriction technologies (V-GURTs),
and the other is trait-genetic use restriction technologies
(T-GURTs) derogatorily called ‘‘traitor [gene] technology’’. Both of them involve deployment of external
stimuli to manipulate expression of exogenous genes in
plants. 73 In V-GURTs, the expression of the exogenous
genes is designed for the sole purpose of inducing sterility. It is this form of GURT that largely accounts for
the intense public abhorrence of the technologies and
thus constitutes the target of the technologies’ bad publicity. This is the reason for the popular designation of
GURTs as terminator technology. Quite unlike VGURTs, in T-GURTs deployment of external stimulus is
designed to activate the expression of genetically engineered or value-added traits without hampering seed
viability. 74
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GURTs’ public relations deficit largely derives from
V-GURTs, as the real ‘‘terminator ’’ technology.
Somehow, the unholy reputation of V-GURTs overshadows the promise of T-GURTs as agro biotech’s
potential marketing instrument of choice for service and
product delivery in a converging industrial environment.
By means of T-GURTs, seed and allied agrochemical
corporations can market both proprietary seed variety
and component agrochemical inducers. In order to
‘‘unlock’’ or activate value-added engineered traits in a
proprietary seed, farmers will have to buy the relevant
chemical inducer that targets specific genes responsible
for activating desired traits. Thus, it is possible for a
farmer to buy a seed with, for example, five potential
value-added traits but who could only afford, or would
only need three of those while leaving the rest latent. In
this way, T-GURTs could enable seed companies to
practice price discrimination of a kind. 75 The price of a
seed may be tied to or mitigated by that of component
agro chemicals required for activating its engineered
traits. A farmer pays and gets only what he/she has
ordered and no more.
T-GURT seeds are capable of propagation beyond
the first generation because they are always fertile. However, a farmer seeking to take advantage of the valueadded traits in the next planting season would have to
fall back on the seed company that has the intellectual
property over the agrochemical that unlocks or switches
the desired value-added traits. Thus, by means of TGURTs, seed companies can take advantage of their
intellectual property rights in agrochemicals in order to
keep the price of proprietary seeds low without compromising their quest for maximum appropriability of
returns on investments in agricultural biotechnology.
A number of features distinguish V-GURTs from TGURTs. First, the latter are said to require few genetic
changes and are easier to be adapted into target plants
and generally simpler to operate. 76 Second, T-GURTs do
not render sterile seed, since farmers can, subject to prevailing PVP laws, replant T-GURT seeds in the next
planting season even though they would need to buy
external chemical inducers or the ‘‘key’’ from the seed
company in order to take advantage of the engineered
traits. Because T-GURT seeds are fertile, farmers can
reproduce them and not depend on seed companies for
seed, a situation that may positively impact on the cost of
seed. 77
The fact that T-GURTs do not render sterile seed
undercuts one of the key criticisms of the terminator
concept. Credible opposition to terminator technologies,
particularly on ethical and socio-economic grounds, is
anchored essentially on the phenomenon of seed sterility. The latter undermines the natural concept of seed
as a genetic copy propagation material, and has the
potential to engender dependency of resource poor
farmers on seed corporations, the so called ‘‘gene giants’’.
That criticism does not have much bite when extended
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to T-GURTs as it does in regard to V-GURTs. However,
the potential tendency of T-GURTs to escalate chemicalization of agricultural production raises biosafety and
environmental concerns.

tinued to pursue development of T-GURTs, which it
considers a credible and viable alternative to V-GURTs. 85

Thirdly, it would appear that conceptually, TGURTs do not foreclose the operation of farmers’ or
crop and research exemptions in the various PVP laws,
the UPOV and under the Food and Agricultural Organization’s International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture (FAO/ITPGRFA). 78 However,
T-GURTs would seem to curtail the extent of farmers’ or
crop and researchers’ exemption under these regimes.
This is so because a farmer’s right or researcher’s latitude
to deal with T-GURT varieties does not extend to the
engineered traits which are, perhaps, their most important attraction. 79 Access to the traits is circumscribed by
pre-existing intellectual property over proprietary chemical inducers.

Regulatory Initiatives on GURTs

Finally, unlike V-GURTs, T-GURTs do not portend
an interminable regime of appropriation. Patent rights
over the component chemical inducers, i.e., so called
‘‘keys’’ that unlock engineered traits have, in most cases, a
20-year term. Consequently, at the expiration of the
patent term, farmers would have uninhibited access
from the public domain to the know-how for making
the agrochemical inducers. However, independently, the
viability of these chemicals is not guaranteed. The use
restriction, or terminator inducers are strictly bundled
with and customized to engineered traits in target crops
otherwise these traits may not be available. 80 It would
perhaps require development of competing varieties
from scratch in order to impeach or dilute pre-existing
terminator processes. 81

As a result of the bad publicity and credible and
often well-founded concerns about terminator technology, big seed corporations and other key agricultural
bodies, notably, the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) have shunned the technology. 82 By now, terminator technology has become a
public relations disaster for seed multinationals, mainly
because of the aggressive public enlightenment campaigns of NGOs, notably the Canada-based ETC Group
and motley indigenous peoples’ and environmental and
allied interest groups. By 1999, Monsanto made a volteface from its initial support for commercialization of
terminator 83 and, with that, sacrificed its proposed
merger with cotton giant, Delta & Pine Land — a joint
holder of a pioneer terminator patent. Yet, the seed
giants could not resist the temptation to keep scrambling
for terminator patents and warehousing them perhaps
for an opportune time. Since the first terminator patent
was issued in 1998 in the U.S., many more terminator
patents have been granted in that country and elsewhere. 84 It is interesting to note however, that after disavowing terminator technology, Monsanto has con-

Concerns over terminator technology have not
gone unheeded. As an aspect of genetic modification, 86
the potential impact of terminator technology tends to
constitute a flashpoint for wider international and
national initiatives to regulate genetic modifications in
food and agriculture. Broader regulatory initiatives on
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are not the subject of this paper and as such would not detain us here.
Keeping our focus on terminator technology, in 1998,
the Fourth Conference of Parties (COP), which is the
decision making organ of the CBD, requested the Convention’s technical advisory body, the Subsidiary Body
on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice
(SBSTTA) to consider, assess and elaborate scientificallybased advice to the COP on ‘‘whether there are any
consequences for the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity from the development and use of
new technology for the control of plant gene expression
as described in U.S. Patent No. 5,723,765’’. 87 SBSTTA’s
report was premised on a background paper prepared by
multi-disciplinary experts in relevant fields 88 which had
the benefit of input from diverse stakeholders after wide
consultations. 89 Building upon the SBTTA initiative, 90 at
its 2000 meeting, the fifth COP, while resolving to continue inquiry on GURTs, recommended as follows:
[I]n the current absence of reliable data on genetic use
restriction technologies, without which there is an inadequate basis on which to assess their potential risks, and in
accordance with the precautionary approach, products
incorporating such technologies should not be approved by
Parties for field testing until appropriate scientific data can
justify such testing, and for commercial use until appropriate, authorized and strictly controlled scientific assessments . . . 91

The CBD’s scrutiny adopts an integrated approach
to GURTs as the latter are implicated under each of the
Convention’s four elements of the program of work on
agricultural biodiversity. 92 As a follow-up to the above
decision, two years later (2002), the sixth COP decided
to establish an ad hoc technical expert group (AHTEG)
on GURTs to further analyze the potential impacts of
GURTs, this time, on small holder farmers, indigenous
and local communities and on farmers’ rights. 93 Meanwhile, the 2000 fifth COP had invited the FAO’s Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
(FAO/CGRFA) and other relevant organizations to take a
convergent approach ‘‘to further study the potential
implications of genetic use restriction technologies for
the conservation and sustainable use of agricultural biological diversity and range of agricultural production systems in different countries, and to identify policy questions and socio-economic issues that may need to be
addressed’’. 94
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At its seventh biannual meeting in Kuala Lumpur in
February 2004, the COP re-turned the 2003 AHTEG
report on GURTs to SBSTTA, pursuant to the latter’s
advice requesting it to consider the report in order to
provide the CBD with technical advice on the way forward in regard to GURTs. 95 Also in the same forum, the
FAO/CGRFA report on GURTs which was commissioned a year earlier than the AHTEG mandate, was
submitted to the COP. 96 In approaching its assignment,
the outcome of which will be presented at the eighth
COP in 2006, the SBSTTA is determined to take an
integrated approach to the two reports, given the different but the inter-related nature of their emphases 97
and, perhaps more importantly, because of the central
role of SBSTTA in the evolving policy deliberations on
GURTs. It is interesting to note that the AHTEG on
GURTs recommended that the COP reaffirm its decision to withhold commercial approval of the technologies. 98 It also urged parties to the CBD ‘‘not to approve
GURTs for field-testing and commercial use’’ 99 in light
of a continued paucity of data on GURTs and in accordance with the precautionary principle. 100
Two issues arise from the ongoing attempt at
devising a policy or regulatory framework for GURTs.
First, as noted earlier, the focus of the approach is on
GURTs’ impact on environmental, biosafety, ethical,
health and food/seed security, including traditional agricultural practices in rural economies. For instance, even
though the 2000 COP mandate to the FAO/CGRFA
requested the latter to work in collaboration with other
international agencies and research bodies, that has not
really struck a balance in the focus of the discussions
between environmental and safety concerns and other
considerations such as intellectual property rights. 101
Similarly, the COP mandate to the AHTEG encouraged
it to take into account not only the FAO/CGRFA work
but that of other agencies, including the UPOV and
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)’s
Inter-Governmental Committee on Intellectual Property
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore (IGC/IPGRTKF). 102 Even though the potential
intellectual property ramification of GURTs are highlighted in both the FAO/CGRFA and the AHTEG as
well as in other expert reports, because of their mandated focus on biosafety, health and socio-cultural, economic and other considerations, no robust discussion
has been generated on the intellectual property question.
It must be admitted, however, that none of the
bodies directly involved with the two reports on GURTs
is an intellectual property body. The reference to WIPO’s
IGC/IPGRTKF is only as a potential collaborative institution whose interest in GURTs is perhaps perceived,
albeit erroneously, as peripheral. Neither WIPO nor the
IGC was represented at the AHTEG deliberations; and
the WIPO did not send a written memo. 103 On the
contrary, UPOV which administers the international
treaty on PVP or plant breeders’ right — a form of intellectual property right — was actively represented at the
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deliberations. UPOV did not only make an elaborate
presentation, it also, in a rather controversial circumstance, submitted two memos to the CBD secretariat
articulating its position. 104 However, UPOV shied away
from seizing the momentum to open an elaborate discussion on the policy implications of GURTs as selfenforcing technological intellectual property. Rather, it
adopted a self-serving approach and limited its participation to highlighting key advantages of the UPOV PVP
regime over GURTs. Compared to the UPOV PVP
model, GURTs, the UPOV position paper rightly concluded, ‘‘may have considerable disadvantages for
society’’. 105 In essence, UPOV portrayed the potential
introduction of GURTs as a punitive fate that awaits
recalcitrant farmers should they undermine the UPOV
plant breeder regime. 106
Shortly after the AHTEG meeting, the U.S. disclaimed the UPOV criticism of GURTs. 107 Consequently, UPOV withdrew it first memo and substituted
one that abandoned its original and informed criticism
of GURTs. The result is that whilst technical and expert
opinions on potential environmental, biosafety, health,
agronomic and other impacts of GURTs are elaborated
in the two major ongoing CBD initiatives on GURTs,
intellectual property receives only peripheral treatment
and is not considered a key subject matter in the mandates and terms of reference of both FAO/CGRFA and
the AHTEG and the first mandate of the SBSTTA.
The second issue is that through ongoing deliberations, agrobiotech and multinational seed corporations
are able to make the case that GURTs have additional
benefits beyond the popular and yet undisputed belief
that they are technological control mechanisms for
appropriation of investment returns on agricultural biotechnology. Thus, no discussion of GURTs would be
complete without mention of the technologies’ lesstalked-about potential benefits. Mention of just a few key
such benefits will suffice.
Perspectives on Potential Benefits of GURTs
On an ironic note, though major concerns about
GURTs, like all GM crops, hinge on their indeterminate
potential long term environmental consequences,
GURTs, especially V-GURTs, constitute devices that aim
at controlling unwanted escape of genetic material into
the wild or the environment. Perceived as ‘‘efficient technology for environmental containment of transgenic
seed (V-GURTs) or transgene (T-GURTs)’’, 108 this characteristic of GURTs is said to be biotechnolgy’s solution to
the topical question of how to mitigate the liability of
proprietary rights holders for crop contamination, i.e.,
intruding transgenic species in the wild or in organic or
even other transgenic farmer’s fields. 109 However, as
attractive as that seems, for open-pollinating species
potential outcrossing of V-GURT varieties, or in the case
of T-GURTs, of negative traits, through natural dispersal
of excess pollens may have a counterproductive effect.
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This may result in spreading sterility or unwanted traits,
by horizontal gene-flow, into neighboring and wild relatives. 110 Also, as part of their potential advantage, TGURTs have the unique potential to enable farmers to
time target the activation of a desirable trait, or withhold
the same, on the basis of the prevailing exigency at that
phase of plant or animal development. 111 Thus, even
though there is credibility in the claim that GURTs have
potential environmental benefits by curtailing transgenic
pollution or gene wandering, such a claim is not absolute, especially in relation to open-pollinating as opposed
to self-pollinating crops. 112 Overall, GURTs have potential both as sources of environmental pollution as well as
for environmental containment or preservation.
Similarly, like genetic modification practices in the
agricultural sector, GURTs are perceived as biotechnological device with potentials to boost global food production and supply. At face value, the phenomenon of
seed sterility is antithetical to an increase in food production because of its potential for crop contamination and
consequent inducement of yield drops in cultivated
areas. However, given its potential to stimulate profitable
plant breeding, GURTs are likely to result in an increase
in food supply, 113 mainly by formal private sector
farmers. At the same time, GURTs could circumscribe
availability of new and useful propagating varieties to
local farming communities, and the scope of seed choice
open to traditional or rural farmers. Thus, one of the
criticisms of GURTs evident in both the AHTEG and
the FAO/CGRFA reports is that GURTs potentially concentrate breeding efforts, with emphasis on value-added
crops, in the private sector. This comes at the expense
natural agro biodiversity and agronomic enhancements
in traditional or informal farming practices. 114 With
regard to T-GURTs, they offer farmers a menu of valueenhancing traits that collectively operate to ensure efficient crop production practices. Despite their capacity to
induce seed sterility, the argument that GURTs have
potential to increase food supply, albeit at some indeterminate socio-economic and environmental costs, may be
hard to impeach.
As part of the broader process of genetic modification, GURTs might not only mitigate risks of potential
liability in the mismanagement of biomedical and pharmaceutical research activities, they could also help
achieve some degree of precision and efficiency in such
activities. GURTs are exportable technologies of relevance in biomedical and pharmaceutical research and in
human and animal drug trials and in the phenomenon
of biopharming. 115 By means of lethal or sterile genes
and trait selection mechanisms, GURTs have potential
to control the use of transgenic materials against unintended purposes in unintended environments and time.
For instance, V-GURTs can potentially mitigate the
unwanted spread of gene-altered pharmaceutical crops
or other transgenic therapeutic and biomedical research
materials.
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In 2002, remnants of ProdiGene biopharm corn,
which is genetically engineered to produce protein used
to manufacture a vaccine against swine diarrhea,
sprouted amongst soybeans that were planted in the
same field the subsequent year. Consequently, they polluted crops meant for human consumption. 116 Meanwhile, the polluted soybeans became intermixed with
other soybeans from other sources and required removal
from the human food chain. In another incident,
ProdiGene’s biopharm corn was suspected to have polluted normal corn planted for human consumption
adjacent to the transgenic biopharm corn field. This
resulted in the destruction of 155 acres of corn fields. 117
Similarly, StarLink corn which was engineered to produce a bacterial protein 118 that creates Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) insect resistance, was originally approved
for animal feed. This was because of its known adverse
and allergic effect on humans. But in 2000, the transgenic corn created panic when food stuff associated with
it found its way onto supermarket shelves in the U.S.. 119
With incidents of the pollution of non-transgenic crops
by transgenic breeds and accidental intermixing of
biopharm crops with their counterparts meant for
human consumption, 120 the potential relevance of
GURTs in environmental containment as applied to the
biopharmaceutical and medical research context
presents one of the possible benefits of the technologies.
Lastly, GURTs represent a potential catalyst for
research and development (R & D) in agricultural biotechnology. 121 Again, like genetic engineering in food
and agriculture, GURTs have the potential to enhance
knowledge about plant genomes and overall functional
understanding of plant and animal genetics and reproductive biology. 122 There are at least two perspectives to
the view that improving R & D in agricultural biotechnology is one of the benefits of the GURTs. The first
derives from the nature of the technology and science of
GURTs. Technologies, such as T-GURTs, for instance,
that have the potential to identify, explore and to functionally control the immense genetic potentials in plants
for targeted objectives, have the promise of pushing the
frontiers of agricultural biotechnology to an unprecedented level. Perhaps there is no more direct evidence of
this than in the continued research and application for
GURTs patents even though the technologies are yet to
be approved for commercial exploitation.
The second perspective to the view that GURTs are
a potential boost to R & D in agricultural biotechnology
is anchored on the principal objective of the technologies. We have previously identified this objective as the
need to ensure profitable appropriability of returns on
investments and concentration of seed monopoly in
transnational seed corporations, a trend which critics
describe as ‘‘biosafedom’’. 123 As a technological control
strategy that plugs the ‘‘leaky’’ loopholes of the permissive PVP regime and other constraints of conventional
intellectual property rights, GURTs are the potential
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armour that the industry appears to have been waiting
for to decisively win their running battle with farmers’
rights to use farm-saved seeds. Capturing industry sentiments, Pendleton argues that ‘‘[t]he combination of poor
legal protection for innovations in crops and easy appropriation of IP limits companies’ willingness to expend
significant amounts of capital required to develop
advanced crops’’. 124 According to him, in addition to
good ‘‘farmstead economics’’, improvement in global
food supply hinges for the most part on efficient and
cost-effective intellectual property which terminator
technology offers. 125
In their study, economists Srinivasan and Thirtle
found that ‘‘[i]f terminator technology were to be applied
to self-pollinated crops, appropriability of returns would
increase dramatically and the level of research expenditures could potentially go up to the level of hybrid crops,
i.e., increase four times the current level’’. 126 Because of
their unequivocal potential value, generally, the debate
over terminator technology now transcends an inquiry
unto whether they could satisfy the ever-changing utility
tests in modern patent jurisprudence. 127 It needs evaluating how fit is a self-enforcing technological or molecular control alternative to intellectual property can be as
a substitute to conventional intellectual property. To
what extent, if at all, can terminator technologies accommodate the public policy considerations that underlie
conventional intellectual property rights? That is the central consideration of Part III.

Part III
GURTs: Public Policy Deficit of a
Technological Alternative to Intellectual
Property
Intellectual Property Theories and Public Domain
Imperative

T

here are diverse and often overlapping theories of
intellectual property rights. 128 However, all of them
share the consensus that intellectual property rights are
‘‘loose clusters of legal doctrines’’ 129 that supervise the
allocation of rights over knowledge. 130 Since our major
focus is not on intellectual property jurisprudence per se,
elaboration of theories of intellectual property will not
burden this paper. It suffices to tap into two of the
leading theoretical perspectives on intellectual property
relevant to our discussion on GURTs, namely, the incentive/reward and contractarian theories of intellectual
property rights.
The general view that GURTs, as watertight technologies or molecular control mechanisms, will boost
R & D in agricultural biotechnology is premised on one
of the fundamental theories of intellectual property
rights. It stems from the notion that an appropriate
incentive or reward mechanism for innovation, be it by
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way of intellectual property or not, results in increased
inventiveness. While the truth of this claim cannot be
easily dismissed, nonetheless, it is not absolute. 131 Innovations in biotechnology or other areas of human
endeavour would continue to occur with or without the
existence of appropriation mechanisms. A better view
would be that, whether in its conventional or an imitative technological form such as GURTs, intellectual
property is a useful incentive to enhance the commercialization of innovation more than it is a motivation for
inventiveness. 132
The contractarian doctrine of intellectual property
right supports a concept of notional contract between an
innovator and the state. In exchange for the disclosure of
valuable information, the latter grants a creator or
inventor of intellectual work an exclusive right of
exploitation of the work for a fixed period after which
the work resides in the public domain. 133 While this
theory may be more apt in the realm of patents and PVP
regimes, it applies with lesser persuasion to copyright
and trademarks, and does not have practical relevance to
trade secret. 134 Nonetheless, a fundamental strength of
intellectual property rights which applies to virtually 135
all their divergent but inter-related theoretical justifications, including the reward/incentive and contractual
accounts, is the recognition of residual domiciliation of,
and access to, useful knowledge in the public domain.
We will return to this point shortly.
In addition to its uneven scope of application over
different regimes of intellectual property rights, one
other drawback of the contractarian model is that there
is no objective way of balancing the value of the
monopoly conferred on the inventor or rights holder.
Specifically, it is hard to ascertain whether the value of
the monopoly is commensurate with society’s benefit in
a given invention. Similarly, it is not clear if the inventor
is short-changed by the traditional time limit of the
monopoly in comparison to the invention’s potential
interminable residual value in the public domain. If anything, this goes to show that intellectual property transcends economic considerations and cannot be accurately evaluated on that basis.
The above synopsis merely samples the controversial nature of theorizing intellectual property rights.
Because each traditional theory of intellectual property
rights provides some accurate but not entirely absolute
degree of theoretical justification, there is no exclusive or
unified theory of intellectual property rights. 136 This is
more so because the dynamism in the nature and evolution of technology, knowledge and information, foists on
intellectual property an equally dynamic and correspondingly malleable character. Thus, if ever there is a
characteristic common to all regimes of intellectual
property rights, it is their instrumentalist character. 137
As a mechanism for allocation of rights over knowledge, intellectual property serves the instrumental purpose of mitigating and balancing often competing claims
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of both the knowledge generator and that of society in
the use of knowledge. Conventional intellectual property
rights recognize the legitimacy of creators’ or inventors’
claim to exclusive exploitation of their knowledge under
the ‘‘just dessert’’ philosophy. 138 Of equal concern to
intellectual property as a matter of policy endorsed by
statute, is the need to encourage creativity, inventiveness
and knowledge generation.

In Feist Publication Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Company, 139 speaking in relation to copyright, the U.S.
Supreme Court observed that the ‘‘promotion of progress of science’’ 140 is the cardinal objective of copyright.
This observation captures the jurisprudence of intellectual property. Reiterating the same rationale, the Cana´
dian Supreme Court has held recently, first in Theberge
and reaffirmed in both Desputeaux and CCH Canadian
that copyright law should aim at mitigating and balancing the competing interests in the encouragement
and dissemination of intellectual and creative works and
creators’ desire for just rewards for their efforts. 141
In its historical evolution, patent has been associated
with well-reasoned public policy regarding the granting
of privileges on the basis of careful consideration and
balancing of interests. 142 Intellectual property is a mechanism that, among other things, aims at promoting the
advancement of, and access to knowledge in the arts,
science, technology and all fields of human ingenuity.
For instance, copyright encourages a concept of originality that enables authors to build upon the earlier
works of others. 143 Despite its emphasis on novelty,
patent law recognizes true inventors as those who stand
on the shoulders of others to make unique contributions
that advance knowledge. 144 And since one of its main
missions is promoting the generation of knowledge,
intellectual property jurisprudence recognizes that no
knowledge is generated in isolation. 145

Intellectual property’s underlying jurisprudence is
not simply a matter of a monopoly economics of invention and creativity. The ability of inventors and creators
of intellectual work to engage in sustainable generation
of knowledge is linked to a vibrant flow of knowledge in
the fountain of the public domain. 146 Since no knowledge is generated in isolation, a rich public domain is a
treasure haven and feeder artery that supplies the lifeblood for intellectual creativity in the private domain.
Thus, as part of its underlying public policy, intellectual
property rights jurisprudence strives to balance the utilitarian and economic arguments for private domain
monopoly and the need to increase the sphere of ‘‘public
omain available for creative manipulations and expres147 in order to fulfill the mission of knowledge proon’’
motion, diffusion and dissemination. To achieve this all
important balance, patent laws, for example, requires disclosure of valuable information in exchange for
imposing a fixed duration of monopoly for rights
holders. It also grants other specific statutory and
common law exemptions to monopoly rights.
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A few illustrations of conventional intellectual property rights’ public policy strategy to mitigate the tension
between private domain monopoly and public domain
consideration will now be helpful. We begin with copyright. Like most regimes of intellectual property, copyright imposes a fixed duration for a creator or author’s
copyright in a protected work. Perhaps the copyright
regime’s respect for the diffusion of knowledge is more
pronounced during the life of a copyrighted work. This
is seen in the exemptions created on the basis of fair
dealing, which include research or private study, criticism or review, and news reporting. 148 While courts
struggle to interpret the scope of these exemptions and
to balance the competing interests in the context of the
complex nature of multiple claimants to rights in created
works, especially in the digital era, 149 these exemptions
underscore the point that diffusion of knowledge is a
public policy imperative of intellectual property rights.

Unlike copyright, the patent regime does not
extend generous exemptions. However, for the most
part, it upholds the policy of encouraging diffusion of
knowledge by insisting on a meticulous process of disclosure of protected inventions by way of patent specification 150 and by a strict enforcement of the fixed patent
term. It bears no stressing that the requirement of disclosure and a fixed duration pave the way for a residual
deposit of vital knowledge in the public domain so as to
facilitate development and diffusion of technology. 151
Because of its territorial limits as a subject matter of
national law, patent law also serves other instrumental
objectives. For instance, ideally, a country can determine,
from time to time, the scope or limits of patentable
subject matter in order to ensure quicker diffusion of
knowledge in areas of national socio-economic policy
priority. 152 Furthermore, patent law serves a public policy
objective by being deliberately restricted in a manner to
protect ordre public or morality and to avoid commercial exploitation of other culturally sensitive and prejudicial endeavours. 153 In essence, intellectual property strives
to ensure the balancing of diverse policy considerations,
including the need to reward creators of innovation on
the one hand, and generation, diffusion and dissemination of knowledge in the public domain, on the other.
Finally, both national and international PVP
regimes under the UPOV, as sui generis forms of intellectual property rights, uphold the requirement of disclosure and a fixed duration of rights for breeders. At its
early phase, plant patents required the deposit of samples
of a novel variety since conformity with technical
requirements of patent specification was then hard to
achieve in the plant breeding context. 154 In addition to
disclosure and a definite duration of right, PVP, like
copyright, provides two key exemptions, namely,
farmers’ or crop exemption which accommodates
farmers’ traditional practice to use farm-saved seeds, and
research exemptions. Despite the progressive circumscription of the scope of these rights through the trans-
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formation in the PVP regime explored in Part I, preservation of some of the rights are indicative of the
fundamental policy thrust of intellectual property rights
in regard to diffusion of knowledge and the protection of
the public domain.
As evident in Part I also, the two exemptions are the
‘‘leaky’’ windows that GURTs attempt to permanently
shut. Not only that GURTs could close the window of
exemptions, the former also have the potential to undermine the disclosure requirement and the fixed term of
intellectual property rights and, with that, dispense with
key public policy imperatives that underlie the jurisprudence and theory of intellectual property rights in favour
of one-sided monopoly economics of invention and creativity.
Intellectual Property, Local PGR Knowledge and
GURTs
As an aspect of its instrumentalism, intellectual
property is, historically, a malleable phenomenon. As we
have seen in Part I, the progressive re-conceptualization
of PVP law demonstrates the dynamism of intellectual
property rights through which it accommodates changes
in knowledge and technology, socio-economic and other
public policy imperatives. The same is true of the extension of the patent paradigm to living materials. As a
technological imitation of intellectual property rights,
GURTs do not have the traditional flexibility of intellectual property rights the significance of which, in the PGR
context, is a hot button issue. Over the last three decades,
there have been concerted efforts, especially through
various international environmental treaties, like the
CBD, and organizations such as WIPO and the FAO, to
commence a preliminary dialogue on reconfiguring conventional intellectual property in response to what a
writer has called its crisis of legitimacy. 155 This is a reference to the inability of intellectual property to accommodate informal local or indigenous knowledge forms.
In the context of PGR, both the FAO/ITPGRFA 156
and the CBD 157 realize that indigenous knowledge accumulated through multi-century trans-generational
labours of farmers in the development and preservation
of plant varieties, provide the primary resources now
being ‘‘improved’’ and appropriated by scientific corporate breeders. 158 In this regard, there is an ongoing
debate on how to ensure that indigenous knowledge is
adequately accommodated, if not by conventional intellectual property rights, by its sui generis or cross-cultural
formulations. 159 Perhaps more importantly, the re-conceptualization of intellectual property rights in response
to the demand of local knowledge holders have
entrenched the concept of equitable ‘‘benefit-sharing’’ for
all stakeholders, especially in the development and use of
PGR. Under GURTs, the ongoing debate to address the
crisis of legitimacy in the intellectual property system in
order to, among other things, accommodate indigenous
or local knowledge forms and benefit-sharing in PGR is
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potentially foreclosed because of the technologies’ onesided focus on breeders’ interests.
We have noted that before the advent of formal
scientific breeding, farmers’ agronomic innovations were
incremental in nature and arose as incidences of their
informal dealings with PGR. The problem of appropriation of returns to innovation hardly assumed a centre
stage. The public sector’s dominant involvement in the
early stage of agricultural biotechnology and agro science
research ensured that the situation remained undisturbed. The entrance of the private sector into formal
scientific research in agriculture raised the critical issue
of appropriation of returns on investment, particularly
upon the backdrop of declining public sector commitment to such research. Even in that context, the invocation of traditional intellectual property regimes or their
sui generis options, such as PVP, was gradual in its extension to the realm of living materials after historic reluctance. When it did, it recognized that by their nature and
on the basis of history, PGR has fostered agronomic
progress and agro biodiversity through a public domain
regime of crop diffusion. Exemptions, such as farmers’
right to use farm-saved seeds, researchers’ experimentation, the need for disclosure of innovation and the limited terms of intellectual property, all helped to ensure
some measure of diffusion of knowledge in plant biotechnology without necessarily compromising innovators’ monopoly claims.
Before GURTs, or more appropriately without
GURTs, it can be argued that the prevailing approach to
the diffusion of agricultural innovation is far more sensitive to the public domain than would be possible if
GURTs were commercially approved. This is so despite
the progressive curtailing of the scope of farmers’ and
researchers’ exemptions under the PVP regime, and their
complete absence in the utility patent framework.
Indeed GURTs have the potential to concentrate agricultural research in the private sector and to restrict diffusion of the resulting knowledge. As ‘‘a technology with
no agronomic benefit to farmers’’, 160 GURTs underscore
the limitations of a technology control mechanism and
their inherent crisis of fitness as a potential substitute to
intellectual property. GURTs do not account for the
underlying public policy consideration of intellectual
property rights, namely, the balancing of the interests of
innovators and that of users or the public and perhaps
more importantly, the need to encourage the promotion,
diffusion and dissemination of knowledge. Along these
sentiments, Pendleton avers that ‘‘[i]n contrast to the
farmers of the 19th century and public breeding programs of the 20th century, the 21st century agribusiness
concern is less concerned with sharing discovery than
with selling them’’. 161
GURTs are deficient in at least five public policy
features of the intellectual property rights. First, unlike
patents, GURTs are not limited by a fixed term. A sterile
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seed is an irrevocably suicidal breed that has no redemptive agronomic value that could reside in the public
domain. Second, GURTs, again unlike patents, do not
have a compulsory disclosure requirement and, as such,
create no notional contractual obligation on the breeder.
Third, GURTs, unlike PVP, do not have farmers’ and
researchers’ exemptions and are not susceptible to other
instrumental public policy interventions common to
traditional intellectual property rights. Fourth, GURTs
do not have a mechanism for balancing the competing
interests of innovators and users of protected varieties
and the public domain at large. Fifth, GURTs do not
account for benefit-sharing or for the potential to accommodate informal farmers’ or indigenous contribution to
improvements in PGR.
As self-enforcing technological device, GURTs
represent an efficient imitation of intellectual property,
especially the patent regime. Because of its tight use
restriction focus or framework, 162 it does not factor in
the underlying public domain orientation of intellectual
property jurisprudence. Thus, it has all the attractions of
intellectual property, especially the patent regime, while
it portends to confer only a fraction of its benefits to only
a portion of stakeholders. 163 Even though the component technologies underlying GURTs may be the subject of patents and/or PVP, their relevance lie in facilitating the primary purpose of promoting sterility and
restriction of the use of protected traits, thereby circumscribing the two major points of diffusion of knowledge
and the promotion of crop potential agronomic benefits.
GURTs potentially limit farmers’ dealing with PGR to
growing and selling of commodity grains 164 for consumption or other uses. In the specific case of V-GURTs,
farmer’s dealing with seed is circumscribed by the
breeders’ remote control of value-added traits. In effect,
GURTs are potential threat to farmers’ traditional
sources of agronomic innovation.

Conclusion

T
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pletely undermined their public policy thrust in regard
to balancing the interests of innovators against the need
for the diffusion of knowledge and the protection of that
knowledge in the public domain.
The advent of terminator technology is the latest
attempt by industry to seek a tighter appropriation
model that has the potential to shut out the public
policy concessions and exemptions that are available to
farmers and users of PGR under intellectual property
rights. Despite their potential to stem the tide of gene
wandering, essentially, GURTs are self-enforcing cellular
or molecular technological alternatives to, or imitations
of, conventional intellectual property protection mechanisms. As a techno-fix to seed industry’s institutional
problem, GURTs have the attractions of intellectual
property. However, they are deficient in terms of the
underlying public policy: the technologies mainly
address the needs of the seed industries at the expense of
farmers and other users of PGR, and generally disregard
the diffusion of agronomic innovation knowledge. Technological devices, no matter how ingenious, cannot fit
within the pantheon of conventional intellectual property rights.
Like its precursor in crop hybridization, 165 economists are wont to argue that the potential success of
GURTs may be a matter for market forces to determine. 166 However, the public policy thrust of intellectual
property rights regarding diffusion of knowledge in the
public domain, transcends interests that propel and justify economic and market forces arguments. Indeed, the
long term consequences of a device that has no, or, at
best doubtful agronomic benefit may never be known or
measured in strict economic terms. As such, the public
policy that underlies intellectual property philosophy is
one which technology alone is incapable of meeting. In
the context of PGR, GURTs undermine all existing concessions inherent or provided under the regime of intellectual property and its promise in terms of equitable
benefit sharing of PGR and accommodation of indigenous knowledge in the direction of a cross-cultural dialogue on intellectual property rights. 167

he exponential progress made in agricultural biotechnology in the last couple of decades and the
Current public policy scrutiny of GURTs, as chamdecline of public financing of agricultural research have
pioned by the CBD, has continued to emphasize enviyielded the entrenchment of the private sector in agriculronmental, biosafety and socio-economic concerns.
tural biotechnology research and exploitation. This state
Although intellectual property has been implicated and
of affairs has heightened the pressure from industry
incorporated in the ongoing initiatives, there is no constakeholders for a profitable appropriation of return on
crete, focused or institutional attempt to explore the
investments in agricultural biotechnology, especially
implication of the attempt by this technology to usurp or
seed production. Through progressive refinements, intelundermine conventional intellectual property regime. In
lectual property rights, both in their conventional and
order to have a balanced and informed policy on
sui generis formulations, have extended their paradigms
GURTs in the unfolding conversation, the present
to living materials after a historic reluctance. Also, they
emphasis on environmental, health, safety and socio-ecohave attempted to circumscribe, or more appropriately,
nomic concerns must be balanced with a more elaborate
to regulate farmers’ exploitation of the propagating
consideration of intellectual property. Without doubt, a
nature of seeds so as to accommodate plant breeders’
stronger involvement by WIPO and other relevant intellaim for reward for their investments. In these
lectual property organizations is imperative in the
ndeavours, intellectual property rights have not comongoing scrutiny of GURTs.
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